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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred On Intermediate Appeal By Reversing The Magistrate Court’s Denial
Of Huston’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
On intermediate appeal, the district court erroneously reversed the magistrate court’s

denial of Huston’s motion to suppress.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-23.)

The district court

erroneously held that Huston was seized without reasonable suspicion when Officer McIntosh
parked near (but without blocking) Huston as he was standing outside his vehicle by the road, in
the middle of the night, in a rural area; turned on his overhead lights; approached Huston; and
explicitly told Huston that he was free to leave and the lights were on only for safety purposes.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-18.) The district court also erroneously rejected the state’s alternative
argument that any brief detention was justified as an exercise of the community caretaking
function. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 18-23.)
B.

The Magistrate Court Correctly Determined Huston Was Not Detained Before Officer
McIntosh Acquired Reasonable Suspicion Of Criminal Conduct
The district court erroneously concluded Huston was seized despite Officer McIntosh

specifically telling him he was free to leave. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-18.) Huston argues the
district court did not err because “Det. McIntosh had no other justification to make contact, other
than his curiosity. Therefore, by making contact, Det. McIntosh illegally seized Huston in the
roadside pull-out.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 6.) But whether Officer McIntosh had good reason to
make contact with Huston is entirely irrelevant to whether he detained Huston. State v. Pick, 124
Idaho 601, 604, 861 P.2d 1266, 1269 (Ct. App. 1993) (“There is no question but that the officer
was authorized to approach Pick’s truck and ask questions, even if no obvious criminal activity
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was afoot.”); State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (“An encounter
between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny
unless it is nonconsensual.”). Whatever the reason for the contact, or even if there was no reason
at all, “a seizure occurs only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” State v. Baker, 141 Idaho
163, 165, 107 P.3d 1214, 1216 (2004).
As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief, Officer McIntosh went out of his way to make it
clear that Huston was free to leave.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-18.)

Most importantly, he

immediately and explicitly told Huston that he was free to leave and the lights were on only for
safety. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 15-21; State’s Ex. 2, 00:00 – 00:03.) Huston does not explicitly address
any of the Idaho case law―like State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659, 152 P.3d 16, 20 (2007),
and State v. Roark, 140 Idaho 868, 871, 103 P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2004)―endorsing the
common-sense view that where, as here, an officer tells the person approached that he is “free to
leave,” there is no detention notwithstanding the operation of overhead lights. Instead, he claims
in passing that the officer’s statement that Huston was free to leave was not part of the totality of
the circumstances because there was “no indication he heard he was free to leave based on his
compliance.” (Respondent’s brief, p. 6.) It is unclear what Huston means. The fact that Huston
remained on scene after he was told he was free to leave in no way implies that he was seized.
The contrary falsely implies that no one who knew they could leave would willingly remain and
talk with officers on a consensual basis. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 463 (2011)
(“While most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so
without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the
response.”). For similar reasons, neither does the fact that Huston remained on scene suggest
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that he did not hear Officer McIntosh. To the extent that Huston is suggesting a per se rule
according to which what an officer says forms part of the totality of the circumstances only if the
officer first confirms that he was heard, such a rule is unsupported by any authority or rationale
and is inconsistent with the objective nature of the question whether a seizure has occurred.
(See Appellant’s brief, pp. 15-16.) Where an officer clearly states that the subject is not free to
leave, a finding of a detention does not hinge on the officer first confirming that he was heard.
Likewise, where an officer clearly states that the subject is free to leave, a finding that the subject
was not detained does not hinge on the officer first confirming that he was heard. Neither does
the question whether a detention occurred hinge on whether, for example, the officer confirmed
that the subject was aware of the number of officers on scene, confirmed that the subject was
aware that guns were or were not drawn, or confirmed that the subject was aware overhead lights
were or were not activated.
The district court’s holding was contrary to the applicable authority and was error.
C.

In The Alternative, Any Brief Detention Was Justified By The Community Caretaking
Function
With respect to the state’s alternative argument that any brief detention was justified as an

exercise of the community caretaking function, Huston relies on two cases: State v. Maddox, 137
Idaho 821, 54 P.3d 464 (Ct. App. 2002), and State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 47 P.3d 1271 (Ct.
App. 2002). (Respondent’s brief, pp. 7-9.) Both cases are distinguishable.
In Maddox, the officer was on patrol “in the foothills” at around 8:00 a.m. when he
encountered a vehicle in which Maddox was a passenger. Maddox, 137 Idaho at 823, 54 P.3d at
466. Maddox and the driver claimed they were looking for a friend who was on foot. Id. After
speaking with the officer, they proceeded into an undeveloped area up a dirt road before parking
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just off of the road on a hillside. Id. Believing they may have found their friend and concerned
about the rough terrain, the officer again drove toward the vehicle. Id. As he approached, the
vehicle proceeded further up a motorcycle trail and the officer initiated his overhead lights to
stop the vehicle. Id.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals held that the community caretaking function did
not justify the stop. Id. at 825-26, 54 P.3d at 468-69. To reach that conclusion the court
emphasized several facts, none of which are present here. First, the court in Maddox noted that
the officer’s concern that the vehicle might get stuck if it proceeded up the hill was a concern
about the prospective possibility that Maddox and his companion might later be in need of aid,
not a concern that they needed aid then. Id. at 825, 54 P.3d at 468. The court held that officers
may not “conduct community caretaking stops whenever they anticipate that a citizen might be
about to embark upon an unwise venture.” Id. Here, Office McIntosh did not make contact with
Huston because he thought Huston “might be about to embark upon an unwise venture,” but
because he was concerned that something had in fact happened to Huston when he failed to
appear around the bend of rural road in the middle of the night where there were no intersecting
roads and there was nowhere to go. (Tr., p. 6, L. 14 – p. 7, L. 24.) Next, the court in Maddox
emphasized that there was no reason for the officer to activate his overhead lights where the
events occurred in an “off-road area” with no possibility of passing traffic and “during daylight
hours” when it was clear the officer was in a marked patrol car. Id. at 826, 54 P.3d at 469. The
court explicitly distinguished State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999),
where the Court of Appeals held that an officer was performing his community caretaking
function when he pulled behind a stopped vehicle and initiated his overhead lights, because in
that case the events occurred in the middle of the night and near a road. Maddox, 137 Idaho at
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825-26, 54 P.3d at 468-69. Because of the time and location of the events, the lights in Mireles
“served important purposes other than detaining the motorist, including warning oncoming
drivers and conveying to the vehicle occupant that the person stopped behind him was a police
officer and not someone posing a threat,” while there were no “such ancillary purposes” in
Maddox. Id. Here, as in Mireles and unlike in Maddox, the stop occurred in the middle of the
night and near a road. Thus, the facts on which the Court relied in Maddox to conclude that the
officer was not exercising his community caretaking function are absent here, and the facts on
which the Court of Appeals relied to find that the community caretaking function was applicable
in Mireles are present here.
Huston next relies on Schmidt. Though Schmidt is closer to the facts of this case than are
the facts of Maddox, Schmidt is still importantly different. In Schmidt, at about 6:49 in the
evening, an officer observed a vehicle parked roughly thirty feet off of the road in an unimproved
pullout, initiated his overhead lights, and parked directly in front of the vehicle “essentially
block[ing] any exit route.” Schmidt, 137 Idaho at 302, 47 P.3d at 1272. The Court of Appeals
held that the detention was not justified by the community caretaking function. Id. at 304, 47
P.3d at 1274. Several facts distinguish this case from Schmidt. First, as in Mireles and unlike in
Schmidt, the events here occurred in the middle of the night when it would be more unusual and
concerning to find a vehicle sitting at the side of a rural road. Second, as in Mireles and unlike in
Schmidt, the officer observed the driver suddenly leave the roadway, raising the specter of some
immediate need of assistance. The officer in Schmidt just happened upon a vehicle already
parked, whereas Officer McIntosh observed Huston’s vehicle disappear around a bend and fail to
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reappear. Third, the nature of the alleged detention is importantly different. 1 As in Mireles and
unlike in Schmidt, the officer simply parked behind the defendant in a manner that did not block
him from leaving.

“In analyzing community caretaking function cases, Idaho courts have

adopted a totality of the circumstances test. The constitutional standard is whether the intrusive
action of the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances.” State v.
Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 754, 947 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1997) (citations, quotation marks, and
brackets omitted). Whether a particular detention is justified by the community caretaking
function requires looking to the nature and degree of the intrusion to determine whether it is
reasonable in the totality of the circumstances. The detention in Schmidt was intrusive in a way
that the alleged detention here was not. While the officer in Schmidt blocked the defendant’s
vehicle so that it could not leave, Officer McIntosh made a concerted effort to park behind (and a
good distance behind) Huston’s vehicle to ensure that Huston could leave if he wanted to. (Tr.,
p. 19, Ls. 5-16.) As discussed above, he then immediately told Huston he was free to leave. (Tr.,
p. 11, Ls. 15-21; State’s Ex. 2, 00:00 – 00:03.) Assuming arguendo that there was a detention, it
was exceptionally non-intrusive and, unlike the detentions in Schmidt and Maddox, was as
minimally intrusive as possible to safely investigate and ensure Huston’s well-being.
Both because there was no detention of Huston and, even if there was, it was justified as
an exercise of the community caretaking function, the district court erred by reversing the
magistrate court’s denial of Huston’s motion to suppress.
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Of course, the state’s primary position is that there was no detention at all in this case.
6

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order on
intermediate appeal reversing the denial of Huston’s motion to suppress.
DATED this 16th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
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